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ABSTRACT
Computer networks are ubiquitous systems growing exponentially
with a predicted 50 billion devices connected by 2050. This dramat-
ically increases the potential attack surface of Internet networks. A
key issue in cyber defense is to detect, categorize and identify these
attacks, the way they are propagated and their potential impacts on
the systems affected. The research presented in this paper models
cyber attacks at large by considering the Internet as a complex
system in which attacks are propagated over a network. We model
an attack as a path from a source to a target, and where each attack
is categorized according to its intention. We setup an experimental
testbed with the concept of honeypot that evaluates the spatio-
temporal distribution of these Internet attacks. The preliminary
results show a series of patterns in space and time that illustrate the
potential of the approach, and how cyber attacks can be categorized
according to the concept and measure of entropy.
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• Security and privacy → Network security; Network secu-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the Internet all connected systems are very likely to be regu-
larly attacked by thousands of malicious nodes [6]. This is especially
the case for newly connected systems with the purpose of testing
their capacity to resist to a given attack. In order to develop appro-
priate protection measures, a key issue is to understand as much as
possible the attackers’ intentions, and possibly to identify the per-
petrator. So far different models have been set up and implemented
to analyze the behavior of Internet networks [7, 15]. Several related
works provide visual and global representations of attack flows on
a large scale [2, 13, 16].
In order to breakthrough the obvious willingness of the attackers
to remain anonymous, one solution is to compromise the attacker by
pushing him to perform some attacks on some predefined, selected
targets. Networks of compromised computers are called botnets and
usually generate a wide panel of cyber-attacks such as Distributed
Denial of Service or fishing [4, 9, 14]. Several methods have been
designed and implemented to detect and analyze bots by either
evaluating the network behaviour [12] or using clustering tech-
niques [5]. The research developed in this paper provides a different
approach. By setting up a series of honeypots whose objective is to
act as new Internet nodes that generate a flow of attacks, our aim
is to study the spatio-temporal and semantic distributions of these
attacks. The Internet is modelled as a large graph, attacks are cate-
gorised and a series of entropy measures of the distribution of these
attacks are computationally derived. The patterns that emerge in
space and time show a series of trends that illustrate the potential
of the approach. These provide several valuable insights on the
possible categories, origins and locations of these cyber-attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the main principles of our modelling approach and the role of the
entropy measures. Section 3 develops the case study and describes
the setup of the different honeypots. Section 4 concludes the paper
and outlines further work.
2 MODELLING APPROACH
The first objective of this research is to model part of the Internet
activity and analyse abnormal behaviours identified as attacks and
their associated intentions. Let us consider an attacker (hatk ) who
wants to disrupt the current operations of a given system and per-
forms an aggressive action on the targeted system (Strд ) property
of a human target (htrд ). The attacker is bound to the target with
the intention of his action as shown in Figure 1.
strд satk
htrд hatk
Message
Intention
Figure 1: Network model - Intentions
In the context of the Internet, numerous systems are likely to
play an implicit role in the path followed by an attack to reach its
target. However, the path taken by the packets is often impossible
to retrace. This leads us to introduce the concept of a black box, that
models these unknown systems between the attacker and target
and as it is also almost impossible to know the exact number of
systems involved. Figure 2 shows the different components of an
Internet network from the attacker to his target.
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Figure 2: Network model - Attacker & Target
More formally let S be the set of systems andM the set of network
messages. The notion of graph formally defines a network path
between the attacker system (satk ) and his targeted system (strд ).
The path at a time t composed by the systems ∈ S used by the
attacker (hatk ) to transmit a message ∈ M to the victim htrд is
formally defined by the Equation 1, Gatk (t) = (S,M).
Gtrд,atk (t) = strд ,m0(t), s0,BB[t0, tn−1],mn (tn ), satk (1)
Where s0 ∈ S the system is connected to the victim system strд ∈
S and messages between systems are represented bym(t) ∈ M . The
set of unknown systems and messages are modeled by the black
box BB.
Since the attacking system and the systems composing the black
box are unknown, the attack pathGtrд,atk (t) is defined as follows.
Gtrд,atk (t) = strд ,m0(t), satk0 (2)
Nodes are defined by systems and edges asmessages, i.e., network
packets. Several useful information can be extracted from these
nodes and edges. For instance, using the IP address of the nodes
can help to extract their geolocation. The original intention of
the attacker can also be derived from the messages extracted and
categorised accordingly.
Let us define the following functions ipv4, country(s), city(s),
coord(s), s24(s), s16(s) returning, the IP address, country, city, co-
ordinates, /24 subnet and the /16 subnet of a given system s ∈ S
respectively. The function blacklisted(s) returns ’true’ if an IP ad-
dress is included in a known list of IP addresses that are considered
suspicious, and ’false’ otherwise. The function intent(m) returns the
intention of the attacker using the content of the messagem ∈ M .
From the principles represented by this modelling approach, the
next step is to analyse the activity and traffic of a given Internet
system, the targets and possible intentions used for anomaly detec-
tion.
The notion of entropy introduced in the seminal work of Shan-
non [10] denotes how much choice is involved in the selection of a
statement, that is, the measure of information diversity or entropy
H defined by Equation 3.
Hc = −K
∑
pi logpi (3)
where K is a positive constant and pi = NiN is the ratio of the
total number Ni of entities of the class i over the total number N
of entities.
We applied the measure of entropy to the different attack inten-
tions and categories identified. Although the notion of entropy has
been already extended to the spatial dimension [1, 3] the initial mea-
sure of entropy has been here considered as the distribution of the
diversity of attacks as they will appear in space over a given period
of time. In order to do so, network messages have been classified
into six different intentions : network infrastructure, DNS (Domain
Name Server), ICS (Industrial Control Systems), Web, Control and
File Sharing. Table 1 summarizes these intentions in function of the
protocol.
Table 1: Protocol categorization per intention
Intention Protocols
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ga
th
er
in
g
Network Infrastructure ICMP ; SIP ; SNMP ; SSDP
DNS DNS ; LLMNR ; MDNS ;
NBNS
ICS BACnet ; DNP3.0 ; IPMI ;
XDMCP ; XTACACS
Web HTTP
A
tta
ck
s Control SSH ; SSHv2
File Sharing FTP ; TFTP
The entropy then characterizes network message intentions. In
other words, the measure of entropy allows us to characterize a
given geolocated IP address behavior. An IP address can be associ-
ated with a continent, country or city, this allows us to characterize
the cyber behavior of a given geographical area. The measure of
entropy as introduced in Equation 4 then evaluates the diversity of
attacks received by a given target and IP address as follows:
Hc = −K
∑
pintention logpintention (4)
3 IMPLEMENTATION
We applied the mechanism of honeypot, that is, a security tool that
can be analysed, probed, attacked and compromised without risk
for the network infrastructure [8, 11]. Honeypots are often used to
deceive attackers, study attacking methods as well as obtain new
and current malware samples. There are different varieties of hon-
eypot, which can be grouped into three categories: low interaction
honeypots, medium interaction honeypots and high interaction
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Figure 3: Number of packets for all IPs : London Honeypot
honeypots. Low interaction honeypots have limited interactions
between the attackers and the system. Services are only emulated.
Low interaction honeypots present the advantage of a low level of
risk due to limited interactions. Medium interaction honeypots are
deprived of an operating system, they emulate complex services
enabling user interactions. Finally, high interaction honeypots are
the most complex type of honeypots. These run a full operating
system including services and a complex configuration. The main
advantage of high interaction honeypots is that services are not em-
ulated, hence, attackers are interacting with a real target while the
owners can track the attackers by capturing all their interactions.
3.1 Honeypot
For the experimentation, a high interaction honeynet was set up
to gather as much information as possible. In order to obtain con-
sistent and identical data, 5 virtual private servers were purchased
in 5 different locations (Fremont, Newark, London, Tokyo and Sin-
gapore). In order to correlate data from multiple sources, each
honeypot was deployed with the same configuration. They run an
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with an SSH server (openSSH), an FTP server
(Pure-ftpd) and a web server (Apache2). A daily PCAP file stores all
network messages and 10 Gb of raw data was generated within a
month. From incoming raw data, respective locations were derived
using the GeoIP API based on the GeoLite database. Intentions are
attributed according to the protocol of the package. In the context
of this experiment, network messages have been classified into six
intention categories introduced in the previous section.
3.2 Data analysis
The entropy of the intentions as well as the number of packets
have been derived per city. A Python script executes SQL queries
on the database containing the honeypot data, then performs the
entropy calculation and visualises the outputs using the free GIS
software QGIS. The data analysed and presented in this section
came from the HoneyPot located in London between August 7
to August 13, 2017. Figure 3 shows the packets volume per city.
A relative continuity of attack flows has been observed over the
Figure 4: Entropy for all IPs : London Honeypot
Figure 5: Entropy and number of packet for all IPs : London
Honeypot
given period, throughout the whole week, day and night. Three
noteworthy groups emerge: East Asia, the US and Western Europe.
Hotspots are clearly apparent in large cities and reflect machine
concentrations over the Internet in these cities. East Asia stands
as the prominent region, with a higher number of incoming nodes
and the biggest packet volumes.
Another trend that appears from East Asia is an important pro-
portion of control attacks, this being a trend often observed in
related studies. In Figure 4, each spot represents the entropy of
the intentions per town. Overall, the larger the spot, the larger the
diversity of attack intentions. It appears that the diversity of attacks
is relatively large in the US and in some specific locations in Europe,
while it is relatively low in East Asia this reflecting a concentration
of attack intentions. Figure 5 combines the data presented in Fig-
ure 3 and Figure 4. The data is normalized and then projected on the
map. This figure illustrates areas where the diversity of intentions
is low, where the number of packets is high and conversely. The
main trend that appears in Figure 5 has been observed on all the
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Figure 6: Zoom In : US attacks intention
honeypots implemented. As seen previously, some similar patterns
emerge in terms of concentration and diversity of intention attacks
and packet volumes.
At a regional scale, additional analyses have been performed. For
instance, Figure 6 illustrates the trends that appear in the US, West
and East coast. One can observe that the distribution of intentions
is totally different although the criterion of high entropy and low
packet quantity is the same. For instance, control-based attacks are
prominent in the West while Web-based attacks are the main attack
category that emerges from the East. It also appears that attacks are
overall much more aggressive from the West Coast (i.e., control),
so this is a pattern that deserves further exploration.
These preliminary patterns that emerge show that the mecha-
nism of honeypot is a valuable solution to observe the distribution
of these attack patterns, and this at different scales of observation.
Over the given period anomalies have not been observed but the
framework might also deliver some valuable patterns over longer
periods of time.
4 CONCLUSION
The significant and continuous growth of the number of devices
connected to the Internet considerably increases the risk of cyber-
attacks. While several projects and frameworks have been oriented
to the analysis of cyber attacks at either the local or global levels
there is a need for the development of operational frameworks to
analyse and identify the origins of cyber attacks on the Internet.
The preliminary and experimental research presented in this paper
introduces a computational approach whose objective is to qualify
and understand the distribution of cyber attacks on the Internet.
Several honeypots have been implemented and act as fake clients
that generate massive attacks. Incoming attacks are categorised in
intentions and their potential locations are approximated. A series
of diversity measures have been implemented. The whole frame-
work characterizes the semantics and diversity of these attacks
in space and time. The potential of the approach is illustrated by
a series of experimental patterns that emerge at the global and
regional scales. Amongst many directions still to explore we plan
to observe to which degree some sequences of attacks might be
observed or not for a given target IP, and if this kind of regularity is
replicated over different target IPs. We also plan to conduct further
studies and experiments to analyse the different attack categories
identified as well as apply machine learning technique to explore
possible attack routes as well as unusual pattern.
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